Aesthetics, part 3: Sibley

How is it that we are able to judge art? What concepts, conditions, or properties are necessary for us to make a reliable aesthetic judgement? Perhaps we could use some condition or rule to apply some aesthetic term. However, Sibley argues in his work Aesthetic Concepts that there are "no non-aesthetic features which serve in any circumstances as logically sufficient conditions for applying aesthetic terms [and that] aesthetic or taste concepts are not in this respect condition governed"

WHAT! What does it mean to say that some aesthetic property is not condition governed, or that aesthetic concepts are not? Sibley wants to say that aesthetic concepts are not rule or condition-governed in such a way as to allow us to know that an aesthetic term is correctly applied solely by being able to specify certain non-aesthetic features of that object.  To clarify what Sibley is attempting to say, let us first distinguish amid aesthetic and non-aesthetic properties. 

1) Aesthetic property: Blueness, gracefulness, etc... 

- let us call these aesthetic properties "Alpha (a) properties"

2) Non-aesthetic properties: Curved, blueness, etc...

- let us call these non-aesthetic properties "Beta (b) properties"

So, Sibley is holding that we cannot hold that some work of art is beautiful merely because of some (b), or that because of a set of conditions {(b1), (b2), (b3)}, some art work is beautiful - or it is (a). That some work of art is beautiful in virtue of some (a) or set of (a), is not sufficient for art being, say beautiful. For Sibley, what is important is not the conditions that determine the properties (as per he feels that conditions are not able to govern aesthetic concepts), but rather, the relationships that exist amid the non-aesthetic and aesthetic properties. 

Thus, for any (a) there is no set of (b) sufficient for alpha. 

To further show what Sibley means, let us use an example. Consider what feature/properties might be used to describe (or act as conditions) someone of whom is intelligent; what might some of those conditions be? Perhaps  we could hold that because some person P is good at math, or that (s)he is able to  understand Wittgenstein with ease. However, we might just continue to add to this list almost indefinitely, but as this list may be "indefinite," it can still count in one direction -towards the fact that P is intelligent and not against P being such. Sibley feels that aesthetic concepts are not governed in this way; we cannot apply certain non-aesthetic qualities to something so as to describe or provide sufficient conditions for an aesthetic concept; but Sibley maintains that there are certain non-aesthetic qualities that can point towards the ascription of an aesthetic quality, but not in a decisive manner. Such non aesthetic qualities are only characteristic of the aesthetic quality. 

Sibley's claim can that there are no sufficient conditions for alpha properties (aesthetic properties) can further be supported by  the concept of supervenience:  A set of properties A supervenes upon another set B just in case no two things differ with respect to A properties without also differing with respect to their B-properties. In slogan form, "there cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference." This shows that even if the Beta properties change, the Alpha properties wont be necessarily affected, but if A changes, then B will be. So, if it were the case that Beta acted, in any sense, as a sufficient condition for Alpha, then any alteration in Beta would cause Alpha to also be altered. 

One of the key points in Sibley's essay is how are we able to understand the relations  amid these aesthetic properties. He feels that the only way to ascertain this 'relationship' is by taste; he claimed that the discernment of aesthetic properties requires a special sensitivity, whereas the discernment of non-aesthetic properties could be achieved by anyone with the ability to receive sensory input; however, the ability to posses this 'special sensitivity' was the result of some faculty of taste as a special mental faculty that is possessed by people with a special sensitivity.

The former raise the question: how is it that some people have this special ability? Sibley -indirectly responds to this and similar inquiries. He argues on (page 138-139) that  we are taught the aesthetic concepts at an early age, by parents, teachers, etc... who employ the same methods as the critic.  This causes some concern, however, the first worry is that what about the people who were not taught anything related to the methods of the critic, and what are those methods?

First, for those who can't seem to grasp aesthetic qualities we can -according to Sibley- get them to "see" those aesthetic qualities. The way that we do that is via the critic, and the critic is able to do this by way of 7 methods:

1) Help us to focus on important non-aesthetic qualities that contribute to aesthetic qualities

2) Simply point out the aesthetic quality

3) Linking the non-aesthetic to aesthetic qualities 

4) Using similes 

5) Compare and contrast

6) Repetition and reiteration 

7) Accompany all of this with appropriate body language and tone. 

So, basically we need to get out an experience the art at hand. It should also be noted that there are some worries about how the properties are presented to us, and how art is able to be negatively affected by conditions but not the other way. However, at your relief -AND MINE- I will not attempt to enter such ground! 

Thanks,

J.R.P

Additional web sites and articles

1) SE

2) Jstore: David Broiles 

3) Some additional comments by some random Professor at some random university. 

Aesthetics, Part Two: Schopenhauer

Our next adventure into the world of aesthetic thought will deal with the ideas and theories of Arthur  Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer's thought takes up a smiler, but distinct, view as German Idealism (Hegel and Schelling). The main reason for his separation from the Idealism of which many of his contemporaries were teaching and propounding, was his disagreement with the over-abundant use of dialectic logic ( the main objection was the historizing tendency in Hegel's dialectic). Schopenhauer, instead, diverts by holding that there is not some rationally-infused will, or a specific principle of self-consciousness, but rather what the WILL - a mindless, aimless, non-rational, urge that is present at the foundation of our instinctual drives; and this same will is what is at the foundation of everything that exist.  He lands upon this former idea by way of his examination of Plato and Kant. From Kant he obtains the idea of the separation of phenomena and the "thing-in-itself"; Schopenhauer follows Kant's lead and accepts that the mind implicitly shapes the only knowable world to its categories of thought (but he rejects Kant's conception of building a system of knowledge - his criticism is that Kant's twelve categories of human understanding reduce down to just one, causality). One important claim that Schopenhauer makes in opposition to Kant, has to do with how knowledge is perceived. He takes sides with Plato - in many different aspects such as: adopting a type of Platonism. 

The "dialectic" that Schopenhauer seems to present is the WILL. The Will is the actualizing drive that produces objects; all individual objectification is really a matter of will, on his account. From this idea, he perpetuates the idea that the world has two parts: 1) the inner part of the Will, and 2)  the world as the Will and the world as representation. 

We are able to know the representational world by the principle of sufficient reason: our sense, motivation, judgment. This principle provides the compete scientific explanation of what something is, for Schopenhauer the what something is, is a representation.

To continue further, from the Will, ideas individuate, or become represented by the actual world. The result of the individuation of the Will is that the world in-and-of-itself is striving against itself and is thus: frustrating, meaningless,  and void of knowledge. Additionally, within this continuos strife there is us, humans, and within us there is also present this unyielding strife in the form of a desire cycle. In this cycle we will to get something/desire something, but because one lacks what you desire, you suffer. However, once you obtain something you possess a brief moment of fulfillment, and then ennui sets in, which is, again, suffering. So, desire -> satisfaction-> ennui-> desire = suffering.

How is it, then, that we can escape this vicious cycle? This is where the aesthetic applies.  By way of art and aesthetic experience, we are able to achieve a more tranquil state of consciousness, and  the genius is able to make manifest the ideas of platonic forms. Aesthetic perception thus raises a person into a pure will-less , painless, and timeless state of knowledge (Will-lessness is the negation of the Will).  So, to explain how this works: suppose that you are outside and you see an amazing sunset, and during that brief moment you experience a time in which you forget all particulars and desires - that is the state of will-less-ness. We appreciate works of art (of the artistic genius) so as to have better knowledge of the Platonic ideas, and the will-less state leads us closer to the these ideas. 

We read:

" Only through the pure contemplation described above, which ends entirely in the object, can ideas be comprehended; and the nature of genius consist in preeminent capacity for such contemplation" and "But what kind of knowledge is concerned with that which is outside and independent of all relations, that which alone is really essential to the world, the true content of its phenomena that which is subject too no chance and therefore is known with equal truth for all time and in a word the ideas, which are the direct and adequate objectivity of the thing in itself, the will?" (The World as Will and Idea)

(So the genius is the capacity to tap into these ideas and represent them via art. And music is able to bypass and know the will directly -music is unique)

The idea that one is able to come to an apprehension of certain Platonic forms by way of art is basically taking Plato's argument upside-down. Plato has claimed that art is down with the reflections and shadows of the physical world, and thus,  draws us away from the truth -the forms. Nevertheless, Schopenhauer holds that this is not the case, rather we come closer to them by art. 

I think that it is worthy to note that the story of Ixion ( a Greek myth) provides an interesting analogy of how Schopehauer cashes-out his idea of the Will and how one escapes it. According to the myth, Ixion was sentenced to be tied to a burning wheel by Zeus. Ixion received this punishment for lusting after Zeus' wife Hera, and the only time that Ixion is able to feel any form of relief from this punishment is when Orepheus played his Lyre. 

Thanks,

J.R.P

Sources and web pages to be visited for further info:

1) Sanford Ency. 

2) Certain lectures 

Aesthetics, Part One: Plato

Some may not know what the word: Aesthetics means, but you should! This word is something that describes some property that is fundamental to us being who we are, human. The admiration of beauty and or being concerned with beauty is what Aesthetics means. Being able to admire the beautiful, the sublime, the mundane -the aesthetic, has been considered a way to admire life and the parts of it that contribute wholly to our existence (this was especially propounded by Nietzsche). Usually, the term/word: Aesthetics has been used to describe the beauty or "aesthetic value" of art. Art and aesthetics have been intricately involved long before the term was coined. Many feel that art is a way for use to escape from pains or appreciate something beside us like -life. Nevertheless, even if you may agree with the previous, there is a strong argument made by one of the most well-know philosophers in history  -Plato.

I would like to take a moment and outline the basic view of Plato's argument, and then provide some thoughts concerning his position. 

To proceed let us quickly pass though some of the general ideas of Plato

1. There exists a more complete and "perfect" realm beside the actual experienced world that is filled with certain entities called: Forms. These "Forms" are eternal and changeless. 

- Forms can be understood as some absolute "idea"

- Plato sometimes describes "Forms" as Hypothesis

2.  Forms are paradigmatic for the physical objects, which are represented by shadows and reflections of the Forms.

- The physical realm (the actual realm) is always changing. The Forms do not.

- The Forms can be understood more adequately by the faculties of soul.

- The faculties consist of reason and understanding.

Now concerning the soul, we must make a distinction (as per this is a large part of his aesthetic theory). The soul consists of three parts.

1. Reason (Highest faculty/part; these people are the rulers Guardians) 

2. Spirited (Passions/thymus; the people of 2, are the guardians/warriors)

3. Appetitive (Desires,appetites, etc... For most people 3 is the strongest and for those people they are suited for being the merchants)

Any state that is ruled by the Merchants or guardians (small 'g') is an unjust state. Moreover, 

A well-constituted person should have reason at the head and thus should be able to keep passions in check. Ok, we have considered and reviewed some basic views concerning Plato's metaphysics, but what does this have to do with beauty and art? In Plato's book The Republic, he is trying to evaluate the question:  What role do the lyric poets have in the ideal state? Plato concludes that they must be banished. Why should they be banished, you ask? Plato feels that poetry removes us from the forms.

 The first account that we find that deals with this argument is that art (poetry) is a mere representation of the forms, and thus causes us to be trice removed from reality. If you think about the constitution of the state we don't look toward the artist for knowledge of true things, of reality; we can further evaluate this claim by noting that since God made the forms, and the craftsman creates the physical objects (physical artifacts). So, humans create some "copy" of the some form when they produce some object. The craftsman must be closer to an understanding of some form than an artist is, for an artist is only able to copy the image or portray a reflection of a form. So, suppose that some craftsmen makes a bed, the bed would then be a instantiation or representation of the form 'bed.' However, the problem, then, is that art -such as painting-  is a mere representation of some physical object, and in this case a painting would be merely a mere representation of the artifact or bed that was made by the craftsmen. Since there is the first instantiation or representation of the form 'bed,' and there is the second instantiation, the art/painting of the first representation of the bed and thus we go from (1) the from bed (2) the physical objectification of bed, and  (3) the painting. This retraction is bad because the forms are truth and thus your are removed from the truth by art. For example: the art of painting is to capture what things appear to be and not as they really are, so Plato ends up cashing art out as shadow's and illusions. 

An additional problem with the argument that art is illusion is that since  art is a copy of a copy art appeals to an inferior part of the soul and can be at best entertainment and at worst mere delusion; the part of the soul that Plato would most likely feel this is being applied to is probably the passions/pleasure part. What I see being a problem for Plato's argument is that some paintings like those of Pollock do not represent any particular object, so how would Plato deal with such art?

The Second [art is powerful and stirs-up emotion] argument that is made in favor of Plato's conception that poetry and such should be cast out of the state. (Against the Poet) Artist stir-up the emotions and make it harder for reason to control the lower faculties of the soul/keep things in line (reason). 

The Third Argument is similar to the second: art work can arouse our sympathetic emotions. the idea here is that this goes against how we want to act, in our own real-life case. So, in other words, you watch something tragic and you weep and wail, but when you face your own tragedy you want to have some control of the passions -you don't want to loose your mastery (Stoic mastery) of the passions of the soul. In the Republic Plato states,

"But we have not yet brought forward the heaviest account in our accusation:-the power that poetry has in harming even the good, is surely an awful thing?"

"Yes certainly, if the effect is what you say"

"Hear and judge: the best of us, as I conceive , when we listen to a passage of Homer, or one of the tragedians, in which he represents some pitiful hero who is drawling our his sorrows in a long oration, or weeping, and smiting his breast -the best of us, you know        delight in giving away to sympathy and are in raptures at the excellence of the poet who stirs our feelings most." 

"Yes of course, I know"

" But when any sorrow of our own happens to us, then you may observe that we pride ourselves on thee opposite quality-we would fain be quiet and patient; this is the manly part, and the other which delighted us is the recitation is now deemed to be the part of a woman"

What are some of the objections that can be made to Plato beside the objection already mentioned in the first argument. 

1) Emotional Reasoning

- There is a strongly  supported claim that reason and emotion are closely tied together. Consider, so called practical reason. Kant talks about practical reason (i.e. ethics).  

In the spirit of Hume: -emotion is closely wed to moral reason, so we don't want to abstract reason from emotion, but rather train the emotion to work in conjunction with reason. Additionally, some moral psychologist feel the imaginative moral element is important in being able to understand the function of ethics; empathic development might be a certain function of art, and art might be able to stretch our capacities so as to make us understand more in depth how we can reason morally. Also, if art has an instrumental value it could help push us towards moral understanding... If we adopt this objection, this seems to really crush his view because instead of art being bad due to its adverse effects on our morality, it is actually better for our morality (but this seems to be mainly for [1] and [2]). How could we argue more solidly for (2)? Even if the arts do lead us from truth, is it an either or statement here; why can one not do both? I personally feel that there is not much of a difference for physical artifacts and art. It could be the case that art might actually make a better representation of some form than some object. So, suppose that I make a bed and that bed looks more like a stone, and suppose further that I paint some image of a bed (a bed that I never saw), and that bed that I have painted is more precise than the created bed (like an instruction picture).  

However, Plato seems to have a good point in a sense. There are certain works that might sociologically or psychologically alter or affect someone to do some incorrect behavior; like morbid accept, moral insensibility, rationalization of bad behavior, even illegal and evil acts.  

That is Plato in a nutshell, and next I will examine the view of Schopenhauer. 

Thanks,

J.R.P

 

Here are a few great links to web pages that discuss this very idea. 

1. Rowan.edu

2. Stanford Encyclopedia 

3. SE/ Plato's metaphysics